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SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE? UPS AND DOWNS OF THE
TEST OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN ENGLAND *
JOHN C. SMITH t

T HE DEFINITION

OF A CRIME usually, though not invariably, requires proof of 1) an act by the defendant; 2) certain
results caused by that act; and 3) certain circumstances. A simple
illustration may be found in the offense of causing criminal damage to property belonging to another.' The act is the physical
movement made by the defendant. The result is the destruction
of, or damage to, the property. The circumstance is that the
property belongs to another. The defendant may not be convicted
unless each of these elements is proved. It must also appear that
the defendant intended to make the physical movement, but there
is rarely any difficulty in proving this intent. In those crimes
known as offenses of "absolute" or "strict" liability, the duty of
the prosecution may end at this point. But in most crimes, particularly serious crimes, they must go on to prove a degree of fault
with respect to each element of the offense, whether a result or a
circumstance. If the defendant is to be held responsible for causing the result in the circumstances in which it is a criminal offense,
it ought to be shown that he was at fault with respect to each of
these elements. The question with which I am concerned today
is the nature of this fault. Is the test of liability to be subjective
or objective?
By a subjective test I mean that, where the definition of the
crime requires a result, the defendant may not be held liable unless it is proved that at the time of his act he knew or foresaw that
the result would or might be caused by his act. Where the definition includes a circumstance, under the subjective test the defendThis article was prepared from the Donald A. Giannella Memorial

Lecture of the Villanova University School of Law, April 16, 1982.

t Professor and Head of the Department of Law, University of Nottingham.
B.A., 1949; LL.B., 1950; M.A., 1954; LL.D., 1975, University of Cambridge.
Queen's Counsel, 1979; Fellow of the British Academy, 1973.
1. See Criminal Damage Act, 1971, ch. 48, § 1(1). Section 1(1) provides
that "[a] person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property
belonging to another intending to destroy or damage any such property or
being reckless as to whether any such property should be destroyed or damaged
shall be guilty of an offence." Id.
(1179)
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ant may not be held liable unless it is proved that he knew at
the time of his act that the circumstance would or might exist.
By an objective test I mean that the defendant may be held
liable where it is proved that he ought to have known or foreseen
that the result would or might be caused, and that he ought to
have known that the circumstance existed or might exist. Under
this test, it does not matter if the particular defendant, in fact,
did not know these things; it is sufficient that a reasonable and
prudent man would have known them.
DEFINITION-CIRCUMSTANCES AND RESULT-CIRCUMSTANCES

It is necessary to distinguish circumstances which are included
in the definition of a crime from circumstances which are, in the
particular case, a necessary condition of the occurrence of the forbidden result. If a circumstance of the latter kind is not present
when the defendant acts, the result will not occur.. I will call the
first class "definition-circumstances" and the second class "resultcircumstances." 2 In the offense of criminal damage, for instance,
the fact that the property that was damaged belonged to another
is a definition-circumstance. Other examples of definition-circumstances are, in bigamy, the fact that the defendant was, at the time
of the ceremony, a married persona and in the offense of assaulting a police officer in the execution of his duty, the fact that the
person assaulted was a police officer engaged in the execution of
his duty.4 In both examples, the definition of the offense requires
proof of these circumstances. On the other hand, in the case of
murder by shooting, the circumstance that the gun was loaded
when the defendant pressed the trigger is a result-circumstance.
If this circumstance does not exist, the result of killing, which is
included in the definition of the crime, will not occur. There is
2. See Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempts, 70 HAuv. L. Rrv. 422
(1957) (where the same distinction was made but the categories were designated
"pure circumstances" and "consequential circumstances," respectively).
3. Offences against the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100, § 57. This
section defines bigamy as follows:
Whosoever, being married, shall marry any other person during the
life of the former husband or wife, whether the second marriage shall
have taken place in England or Ireland or elsewhere, shall be guilty
of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable to [imprisonment)
for any term not exceeding seven years.
Id. (emphasis added).
4. Police Act, 1964, ch. 48, § 51. This section provides that "[a]ny
person who assaults a constable in the execution of his duty, shall be guilty of
an offence." Id.
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no reference in the definition of murder to a loaded gun, but it
happens that, in the particular case, the existence of that circumstance, when the trigger is pressed, is a condition precedent to the
commission of the crime.
In the late nineteenth century, the relationship between
knowledge of the existence of result-circumstances and foresight
of results was considered by Oliver Wendell Holmes in The Common Law,5 which has had a profound effect on the law in England
and elsewhere. In this work, Holmes discussed Stephen's wellknown definition of "malice aforethought," the mental element in
murder, which required "knowledge that the act which causes
death will probably cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm
to, some person .
6 Holmes pointed out that knowledge that
the act will probably cause death is the same thing as foresight of
the result of that act.7 He then observed:
*..."

What is foresight of consequences? It is a picture of a
future state of things called up by knowledge of the present state of things, the future being viewed as standing
to the present in the relation of effect to cause. . . . If
the known present state of things is such that the act done
will very certainly cause death, and the probability is a
matter of common knowledge, one who does the act,
knowing the present state of things, is guilty of murder,
and the law will not inquire whether he did actually foresee the consequences or not. The test of foresight is not
what this very criminal foresaw, but what a man of reasonable prudence would have foreseen. 8
The test of foresight of consequences (or results), according
to Holmes, is objective. 9 The question is, would a man of reasonable prudence have foreseen the result in question? But the
knowledge of the circumstances to be attributed to the man of
reasonable prudence is that knowledge actually possessed by the
defendant. Thus, the test of knowledge of result-circumstances is
5. 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 53-54 (1881). For a fuller discussion
of Holmes's views on this question, see Smith, Intention in Criminal Law, 27
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 93 (1974).
6. J. F. STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 212 (L. F. Sturge 9th
ed. 1950).
7. 0. W. HOLMES, supra note 5, at 53.
8. Id. at 53-54 (emphasis added).

9. For a discussion of a modern application of this test, see text accompanying notes 53-61 infra.
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subjective. Murder by shooting provides a useful example. In
such a crime we must inquire whether the defendant actually
knew that the gun was, or might be, loaded. So too for any other
circumstances upon which the result, killing, depends. In addition, we must then ask whether a man of reasonable prudence,
knowing what the defendant knew, would have foreseen that death
would or might result. It is immaterial whether the defendant so
foresaw or not.
It was this objective theory which was embraced by the House
of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith. 10 In this
case, Jim Smith was driving a car in which there was stolen property. In the normal course of traffic control, a police officer
stopped Smith. Another officer came to the window of the car
and saw what he rightly suspected to be stolen goods in the back.
He told Smith to pull over to the curb. Smith did so and the
constable walked beside the car. Smith then suddenly accelerated
down an adjoining road. The constable managed to hang onto
the car for a time, but eventually was thrown off into the path of
an oncoming car and was killed. At his trial for murder, Smith
said that his only thought was to get away and that he had no
intention of killing, or causing serious injury to the constable.
The trial judge, Donovan, directed the jury, "[i]f you are satisfied
that . . . he must, as a reasonable man, have contemplated that
grievous bodily harm was likely to result to that officer . . . and

that such harm did happen and the officer died in consequence,
then the accused is guilty of capital murder." 11 The Court of
Criminal Appeal quashed his conviction for capital murder and
substituted a verdict of manslaughter.12 In their opinion, the
judge had wrongly applied an objective test-that of the reasonable
man. The real question was whether Jim Smith, in the ten seconds or so during which the entire episode occurred, realized that
what he was doing was likely to cause grievous bodily harm.' 3
The House of Lords restored the conviction. 14 In a unanimous
judgment, they stated that the "true principle" was that set out by
Holmes in The Common Law,1 and they concluded that the trial
10. 1961 A.C. 290, affirming, [1960] 2 All E.R. 451.
11. Id. at 291.
12. Id. at 303.
13. Id. at 302.
14. Id. at 335-36.
15. Id. at 327. For a quotation of the passage by Holmes which was
specifically cited by Viscount Kilmuir, see text accompanying note 8 suira.
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judge had complied with it.16 While the trial judge had used a
subjective test in his instructions to the jury regarding the defendant's knowledge of the circumstances and the nature of the acts
done to the constable, 17 he used an objective test, like that set
forth in The Common Law and in numerous cases cited by the
House of Lords,' 8 in his instructions regarding the defendant's
foresight of the harm that was likely to occur. 19 The House of
Lords held that the test of foresight of grievous bodily harm thereafter to be applied was emphatically and wholly objective. As
Viscount Kilmuir observed:
[I]t matters not what the accused contemplated as the
probable result or whether he ever contemplated at all,
provided he was in law responsible and accountable for
his actions ....
On the assumption that he is so accountable for his actions, the sole question is whether the unlawful and voluntary act was of such a kind that grievous
20
bodily harm was the natural and probable result.
The decision provoked a storm of criticism 21 and even led the
High Court of Australia to declare that it could no longer regard
22
decisions of the House of Lords as binding.
DEFINITION-CIRCUMSTANCES

I now turn to "definition-circumstances." Paradoxically, the
traditional view has been that an objective test is to be applied to
these. The principal authority relied on here is the 1889 decision
of the majority of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, and, particularly, the judgment of Mr. Justice Stephen, in Regina v. Tol16. 1961 A.C. at 327.

17. Id. at 330-31. Specifically, the judge asked the jury: "[T]o consider
what were the exact circumstances at the time as known to the respondent
and what were the unlawful and voluntary acts which he did towards the
police officer." Id.
18. Id. at 327-30, citing Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard, 1920
A.C. 479; Regina v. Ward, [1956] 1 Q.B. 351; Rex v. Philpot, 7 Crim. App.
140 (1912); Rex v. Lumley, 22 Cox C.C. 635 (1911); Regina v. Faulkner, 13
Cox C.C. 550 (1877).
19. 1961 A.C. at 331.
20. Id. at 327.

21. See articles cited in J.C. SMITH & B. HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 290 n.19
(4th ed. 1978).
22. Parker v. The Queen, 111 C.L.R. 610, 632-33 (Austl. 1963), rev'd on
other grounds, 111 C.L.R. 665 (P.C. 1964). See also Australia and the House
of Lords-Parker v. The Queen, 1963 CuM. L. REV. 675.
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son,23 that the defendant was not guilty of bigamy because, at the
time of her second marriage she believed, on reasonable grounds,
that her husband was dead. In reaching this conclusion, Mr.
Justice Stephen observed:
I think it may be laid down as a general rule that an
alleged offender is deemed to have acted under that state
of facts which he in good faith and on reasonable grounds
believed to exist when he did the act alleged to be an
offence.
I am unable to suggest any real exception to this
2
rule, nor has one ever been suggested to me. '
Tolson has ever since been the leading authority for the proposition that a mistake as to a fact in the definition of the crime is a
defense only if it is a mistake which a reasonable man might have
made.
Thus, according to the accepted theory at the time of Director
of Public Prosecutions v. Smith, the courts were required to apply
1) a subjective test to result-circumstances;
2) an objective test to foresight of results; and
3) an objective test to definition-circumstances.
THE TREND TO SUBJECTIVISM

The next fifteen years saw a steady, though not uninterrupted,
movement towards the application of a subjective test to both the
foresight of results and definition-circumstances, a trend which I
attempted to describe in a lecture to the Canadian Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies.2 5 Scarcely had I delivered that lecture
than the trend began to be reversed and there is now a movement,
not only in the courts but also among academic lawyers, back to
objectivity.
Let me first discuss the landmarks in the movement to subjectivity. This movement began as a response to the much criticized Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith.26 This decision
was referred to the Law Commission, the body charged with the
23. [1889] 23 Q.B.D. 168.
24. Id. at 188.
25. Smith, The Trend To Subjectivism in English Criminal Law, THE
CAMBRDGE LECTURES 176 (D. Mendes da Costa ed. 1980).
26. For a discussion of Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith, see text
accompanying notes 10-22 supra.
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duty of making proposals for the reform of the law of England.
As a result of their recommendation 2 7 Parliament enacted section
8 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1967,28 which was intended to
reverse the effect of Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith.
Section 8 provides:
A court or jury, in determining whether a person has
committed an offence,(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable
consequence of those actions; but
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee
that result by reference to all the evidence,
drawing such inferences from the evidence as
29
appear proper in the circumstances.
Consequently, under section 8, when a question of intention
or foresight is in issue a subjective test must be applied, not only
to the defendant's knowledge of result-circumstances, but also to
his foresight of results. Nonetheless, section 8 is necessarily limited
in its application. It says nothing about definition-circumstances
and therefore as to that aspect of a crime, the common law still
operates.
Nor does section 8 say anything about when intention or foresight is required. That is a matter for the definition of the particular offense.30 If the offense is held to be one of absolute liability, requiring no proof of culpability of any kind, or if it is
held to be an offense of negligence, then section 8 does not apply.
It applies only when it has been determined that intention or
foresight with respect to some particular result must be proved.
The effectiveness of this section, therefore, depends on how the
substantive law is interpreted.
It appears that English law was at that time moving toward
a position in which intention to cause, or at least foresight of, the
results included in the definition of the crime was a necessary
condition of liability in the case of most serious offenses. In our
27.

LAW

COMMISSION,

IMPUTED

CRIMINAL

INTENT

(DIRECTOR

OF

PUBLIC

No. 10 (1967).
28. Criminal Justice Act, 1967, ch. 80, § 8.
29. Id.
30. See J.C. SMITH & B. HOGAN, supra note 21, at 69-72. See also Director
of Public Prosecutions v. Majewski, [1976] 2 All E.R. 142, 151, 170.
PROSECUTIONS V. SMITH),
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somewhat antiquated Offences Against the Person Act of 1861,3 1
most of the offenses must be committed "maliciously"; 82 and by
1957, that word had acquired a technical meaning. In Regina v.
Cunningham,88 it was held that "malice" meant:
[E]ither (1) an actual intention to do the particular kind
of harm that in fact was done; or (2) recklessness as to
whether such harm should occur or not (i.e., the accused
has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be
done, and yet has gone on to take the risk of it). It is
neither limited to nor does it indeed require, any ill-will
84
towards the person injured.
In 1971, Parliament, on the recommendation of the Law
Commission,8 5 enacted the Criminal Damage Act,8 6 repealing the
Act of 1861.
This greatly simplified the previous law. The
archaic term, "maliciously" was replaced by the modern terminology of "intending to" or "being reckless as to whether." 87 However, the Law Commission, as its report makes plain, did not
intend to effect any substantive change in the law; it was simply
inviting Parliament to adopt the law as stated in Cunningham and
to put it into modern language. 88 Parliament, if its members had
31. See Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, 24 &-25 Vict., ch. 100.
32. See id. §§ 23-24.
33. [1957] 2 Q.B. 396.
34. Id. at 399-400, quoting

C. Kr.NNY, OUTLINES

OF

CRIMINAL LAW (16th

ed. 1952).
35. LAW COMMISSION, CRIMINAL LAW REPORT ON OFFENCES OF DAMAGE
TO PROPERTY, No. 29 (1970) [hereinafter cited as LAW COMMISSION REPORT].

36. For the relevant text of the Criminal Damage Act, see note 1 supra.

37. Id.
38. LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 35, at 44. In its discussion of
the mental element, the Law Commission observed:
In the area of serious crime (in contrast to offences commonly
described as "regulatory offences" in which the test of culpability may
be negligence, or even a test founded on strict liability) the elements
of intention, knowledge or recklessness have always been required as
a basis of liability. The tendency is to extend this basis to a wider
range of offences and to limit the area of offences where a lesser
mental element is required. We consider, therefore, that the same
elements as are required at present should be retained, but that they
should be expressed with greater simplicity and clarity. In particular,
we prefer to avoid the use of such a word as "maliciously," if only

because it gives the impression that the mental element differs from
that which is imposed in other offences requiring traditional mens rea.
It is evident from such cases as R. v. Cunningham and R. v. Mowatt
that the word can give rise to difficulties in interpretation.
Id. (citations omitted).
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read the report on which the bill was based, must be presumed
to have had the same intention. In a series of cases, the Court of
Appeal construed "recklessly" to require foresight of the particular
result proscribed.39 This concept of recklessness is substantially
the same as that to be found in the American Model Penal Code
which states that a person acts recklessly when he "consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk." 40 When rape was
defined by statute for the first time in the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act of 1976,41 the mens rea specified was knowledge that the
woman did not consent or recklessness as to whether she consented to the intercourse. In 1980 the Criminal Law Revision
Committee made recommendations 42 for reform of the whole law
of offenses against the person which would generally require recklessness and which would define recklessness to require foresight
of consequences. Accordingly, so far as serious crime was concerned, we seemed well on the way to the adoption of a general
theory of subjective liability.
There has been no legislation corresponding to Section 8 of
the Criminal Justice Act of 1967 in relation to definition-circumstances. It seemed, however, that the decision of the House of
Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan 43 did for
definition-circumstances what section 8 had done for results. In
Morgan, the defendant invited three friends to have sexual intercourse with his wife, telling them that she would like them to do
so and ignore any show of resistance because this was merely to
add to her pleasure. The three men had intercourse with Mrs.
Morgan who did not in fact consent. They were charged with
rape and Morgan was charged with aiding and abetting them.44
39. See Briggs, 63 Crim, App. 215 (1976) (quashing the trial court's conviction of a man under the Criminal Damage Act of 1861, for using an objective test in instructing the jury on the defendant's state of mind); Parker,
63 Crim. App. 211 (1976); Regina v. Stephenson, [1979] 1 Q.B. 695. For a
discussion of Parker and Stephenson, see text accompanying notes 53-56 &
106-10 infra.
40. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
41. Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 1976, ch. 82, § I. This section

provides that a man commits rape if "(a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse

with a woman who at the time of the intercourse does not consent to it; and
(b) at the time he knows that she does not consent to the intercourse or he
is reckless as to whether she consents to it ...." Id. For a discussion of this

act, see J.C. SMITH & B. HOGAN, supra note 21, at 400.
42.

CRIMINAL LAW

REVISION

FOURTEENTH REPORT, CMND

COMMITTEE,

OFFENCES

AGAINST

THE PERSON,

7844 (1980).

43. 1976 A.C. 182.

44. Id. at 185.
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The trial judge directed the jury:
Further, the prosecution have to prove that each defendant intended to have sexual intercourse with this woman
without her consent. Not merely that he intended to
have intercourse with her but that he intended to have
intercourse without her consent. Therefore if the defendant believed or may have believed that Mrs. Morgan consented to him having sexual intercourse with her, then
there would be no such intent in his mind and he would
be not guilty of the offence of rape, but such a belief
must be honestly held by the defendant in the first place.
He must really believe that. And, secondly, his belief
must be a reasonable belief; such a belief as a reasonable
man would entertain if he applied his mind and thought
45
about the matter.

Thus the judge told the jury: 1) that they could not convict
unless they were satisfied that the defendant intended to have
intercourse with a woman without her consent; but 2) they could
convict if they found that the defendant believed, without reasonable grounds, that the woman was consenting.
In the House of Lords, counsel for both sides agreed that these
propositions were "wholly irreconcilable." Counsel for the defendants argued that the first proposition was correct and the second wrong; whereas counsel for the Crown said that the second
proposition was the correct one.46 The direction, as Lord Cross
pointed out, presented the jury with "two incompatible alternatives." 47 The majority of the House held that the first proposition was correct; and, as Lord Hailsham said, once it was accepted
that the mens rea was an intention to commit nonconsensual intercourse, it followed, "as a matter of inexorable logic" that the
prosecution failed if it did not prove that intention.4s A genuine
belief that the woman was consenting, even if unreasonable, was
inconsistent with such an intention and an answer to the charge.
It should be noted, however, that notwithstanding the misdirection,
the convictions of rape were upheld. The evidence established
beyond a doubt that the defendants knew Mrs. Morgan was not
49
consenting.
45. Id. at 187.

46. Id. at 200-01.
47. Id. at 203.

48. Id. at 204.
49. Id. at 214.
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Morgan did not overrule Tolson,50 the bigamy case. Lord
Hailsham stated that he viewed Tolson as "a narrow decision
based on the construction of a statute, which prima facie seemed
to make an absolute statutory offence." 51 Lords Cross and Fraser
52
expressed similar views on Tolson.
Thus, by 1976, subjectivism appeared to have triumphed.
Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1967 had established a
subjective test for foresight of results; Morgan had established a
subjective test with respect to definition-circumstances when the
fault element extended to them; and the courts' interpretation of
"maliciously" and "recklessly" had apparently ensured that generally the law did require that the defendant himself foresee the
consequences of his acts and know the possible existence of circumstances. It now appears that the triumph may have been shortlived. Each of these three pillars of the subjectivist trend has
been shaken in some degree by their interpretation in recent cases.
DOES THE HOLMESIAN THEORY OF FORESIGHT LIVE ON?

It appeared to me that Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act
of 1967 must have put an end to Holmes' theory in English
law. Nonetheless, Holmes' theory persists in England today. In
Parker,58 the defendant, frustrated by his inability to make a telephone call, slammed the receiver of a public telephone down with
such force that he smashed it. He was charged with recklessly
causing criminal damage. He said it never occurred to him that
he might damage the telephone. He was convicted on a direction
by the trial judge that a reckless act is one done "without thought
for the consequence[s]," 54 and his conviction was upheld. The
Court of Appeal pointed out that he was fully aware of all the
circumstances: that he was handling a receiver made of breakable
material, that the cradle was made out of similar material, and
that he was aware of the degree of force he was using. In those
circumstances if he did not know there was some risk of damage,
he was "deliberately closing his mind to the obvious." 55 I have
great difficulty with the last proposition. A person cannot de50. For a discussion of Tolson, see notes 23-24 and accompanying text
supTa.

51. 1976 A.C. at 215.

52. Id. at 202, 238.

53. 63 Crim. App. 211 (1976).
54. Id. at 214.
55. Id.
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liberately close his mind to the existence of a risk unless he knows
the risk exists and that, of course, was what Parker denied. Passing over that difficulty, we are left with the apparent holding that,
because he knew of the relevant result-circumstances-the fragility
of the material and the degree of force used-he must be held to
have foreseen the result. This holding seems to resurrect the
Holmesian theory. Surprisingly, this aspect of Parker has received
support from an advocate of the subjectivist theory of criminal
liability-Professor Glanville Williams. In 1978 he wrote:
It is impossible to believe that Parker did not know the
risk of damaging it [the receiver]. It is a misunderstanding of the legal requirement to suppose that this knowledge of risk must be a matter of conscious awareness at
the moment of the act. We grow up in a world in which
we come to know, from the earliest age, that things are
broken by rough treatment. Some things are more resistant than others: one could, in a temper, kick a farm
tractor or the wheel of a lorry without doing damage.
But is there anyone who does not know that a telephone
receiver can be damaged by being violently slammed
down? The fact that it is slammed down because of a
feeling of frustration is nothing to the purpose.5 6
Professor Williams' opinion seems scarcely distinguishable from
the Holmesian concept of foresight of consequences. 57 If it is
right, it is difficult to see what all the fuss over Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Smith,5 8 was about-and Williams was one of its
most severe critics. 59 When Jim Smith was sitting quietly in his
armchair at home, he was no doubt well aware that, if he drove
off in a car at high speed on a busy street with a policeman clinging to the hood, there was at least a high probability that the
policeman would suffer serious injury or death. There was no
evidence to suggest that Mr. Smith differed from any other reasonable man in this respect. The Court of Appeal, when quashing
his conviction, thought that the relevant question was as to the
state of mind of the defendant during the ten seconds or so during
56. G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 79 (1978); see also Williams,
Recklessness Redefined, 40 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 252, 260 (1981).
57. See notes 5-9 and accompanying text supra.
58. For a discussion of Director of Public Prosecutionsv. Smith, see notes
10-22 and accompanying text supra.
59. See, e.g., G.

WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw

Constructive Malice Revived, 23

MODERN
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which the whole incident took place.60 If they were wrong, the
criticism of the House of Lords was unfounded. It is submitted,
however, that the Court of Appeal was right and that this opinion
has been confirmed by section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1967.
Section 8 requires the court or jury to consider whether the defendant, under the circumstances in which the event took place,
actually foresaw the event, not whether he would have foreseen it
had he been sitting quietly at home. 1
The comment made by Professor Williams in the passage
quoted would, in my opinion, undermine the whole of the subjectivist's position. If we are to inquire whether the defendant
would have foreseen the result had he not been in a state of frustration or anger, ought we not similarly to discount the fact that the
defendant was distracted by worry, anxiety, excitement or that he
was merely absent-minded or in a panic? On what principle would
we distinguish between one emotion and another and how in practice could a court or jury make such distinctions? If the defendant
did not foresee in fact, he can be held liable for a crime requiring
foresight only by a fiction, through a "constructive crime," of the
kind of which the law, in modern times, has been slowly ridding
itself.
If Professor Williams' opinion prevails, the reform effected by

Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act will be largely stultified and
we will have reverted to the law at the time of Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Smith, or something very close to it.
MORGAN: DOES IT APPLY TO CRIMES OTHER THAN RAPE?

Apparently alarmed by the boldness of the decision in Morthe courts have tended to limit its effect to the law of rape
and to state that it lays down no general principle. Tolson, far
from being reduced to the status of a narrow decision on the construction of a statute, is tending to reemerge as the authority on
general principle. The first hint of this came in 1980 with the
decision of Barrett and Barrett.6 3
gan, 62

60. 1961 A.C. at 302. Counsel argued, "[p]anic is no defence. It does not
go to intent." Id. at 297. The Court of Appeal, however, seems to have
disagreed.
61. For the relevant passages of section 8, see text accompanying note 29
supra.
62. For a discussion of Morgan, see text accompanying notes 43-52 supra.
See also Cowley, The Retreat from Morgan, 1982 CRIM. L. REV 198.
63. 72 Crim. App. 212 (1981).
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In that case, the defendants were convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. Certain bailiffs were executing a warrant
to take possession of a house which belonged to Alan Barrett and
which had been sold pursuant to a court order. The defendants
used force in repelling the bailiffs. Although they were aware of
the court order, they believed that it had been obtained by fraud,
that the bailiffs were trespassers, and that, accordingly, they were
entitled to use force. The court rejected this defense stating that
a losing party in litigation is not "entitled to snap his fingers at
the due processes of law just because he is sure that his view is
right and the Courts, the judges and everybody else are wrong." 64
In rejecting the defendants' arguments based on Tolson 65 the
court explained that:
The case of Tolson and the cases preceding and following Tolson correctly affirm the principle that an honest
belief in a certain state of things does afford a defence,
including an honest though mistaken belief about legal
rights. But those cases were never intended to extend
and do not extend, to the situation where the rights in
question have been the subject of litigation between the
parties and a court of competent jurisdiction has stated
what the rights are, but the losing party simply refuses,
through honest obstinacy, to accept the order of the
court. 0
It is noteworthy that the court referred to an honest belief,
not an honest and reasonable belief. The defendants also relied
on Morgan, but the court observed:
Although we recognise that as a matter of strict logic
there is no reason why a logician should not take the
view that the principle expressed in the context of the law
of rape should equally apply in the field of honest mistake
as to civil rights as a defence to a charge of assault, in our
view that would be developing the principles applied in
their Lordship's House to rape to a quite different branch
of the law in a way which is not justified and which is
wholly inconsistent with the law as previously understood
on this subject.67
64. Id. at 216.
65. For a discussion of Tolson, see notes 23-24 and accompanying text

supra.
66. 72 Crim. App. at 216 (citations omitted).
67. Id.
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Considerations of policy no doubt influenced the Barrett court
to reject the defense advanced in that case. The bailiffs were in
fact acting lawfully under a court order and should not so lightly
be deprived of the protection of the criminal law. The ratio
decidendi is probably confined to the case where the defendant
does not accept the validity of a court order. His mistake is one
of law. If the defendants had mistakenly believed that the men
were not bailiffs at all, but imposters, or that they were bailiffs,
but the court had made no order, then it would be a different case
and, in principle, the defendants ought to have had a defense.
They were entitled to use force to repel trespassers and, on the
facts as the defendants believed them to be, the bailiffs were
trespassers.
Barrett, though containing a disturbing hint that the operation of the principle in Morgan is limited to rape, did not actually
decide anything incompatible with the principle of that case being
one of general application. The same cannot be said, however, of
Phekoo, 18 where the Court of Appeal, in a considered obiter
dictum, stated that Morgan is confined to rape. 69 In Phekoo, the
defendant was charged under the Protection from Eviction Act
of 1977 with doing certain acts "with intent to cause the residential occupier to give up occupation of those premises." 70 The
two men in occupation of the premises were in fact residential
occupiers so the defendant caused the actus reus of the crime.
His counsel submitted that the defendant had a defense if he
believed they were not residential occupiers but squatters. The
prosecution contended that, notwithstanding the use of the words
"with intent", such a belief was no defense.71 Courts have sometimes followed reasoning along the following lines:
1) A intended to evict B.
2) B was a residential occupier.
3) Therefore A intended to evict a residential occupier.
The conclusion is, however, fallacious if A did not know B
to be a residential occupier. Intention exists in the mind of the
defendant. If the defendant believed the occupier to be a squatter,
68. 73 Crim. App. 107 (1981).
69. Id. at 116.
70. Id. at 108, citing Protection from Eviction Act, 1977, ch. 43, § 1(3).
71. 73 Crim. App. at 115.
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it was simply untrue to say that he intended to evict a residential
occupier. The distinction is crucial. The eviction of a squatter
by the means envisaged was not unlawful. An intention to so
evict a squatter was not a criminal intention. The court properly
rejected the prosecution's argument on this point and held that
"guilty intent does, or ought, when the issue is raised, to comprise
proof of intent to harass someone who is known or believed by
the offender to be a person who, in effect, is not just a 'squatter.' " 72 The court went on, however, to say that "there must be
a reasonable basis for the asserted belief." 73
These two statements seem to pose precisely the same incompatible alternatives which the trial judge presented to the jury in
Morgan. The two propositions cannot stand together. If the
second proposition is correct then it is simply not true to say that
it must be proved that the defendant knew or believed that the
person to be evicted was not just a squatter; it is sufficient that he
ought to have known. If the second proposition is correct, a defendant who in fact intends to evict a squatter may, if he had no
reasonable grounds for his belief, be held to have had an intention
to evict a residential occupier. As the word "intention" is used
in the section, 74 it is submitted that the former of the incompatible
alternatives is the proper one and, if so, it follows that the latter is
improper.
There were two points in Morgan. The first was that the
mens rea in rape was an intention to have intercourse with a
woman without her consent. That aspect of the decision was indeed confined to the law of rape and today has no relevance in
English law, being superseded by the Sexual Offences (Amend72. Id.
73. Id. at 117.

The court noted that the Tolson standard of honest and

reasonable belief had been accepted until the decision in Morgan which it
stated was confined to the offence of rape. Id. at 116.
74. See, e.g., Protection from Eviction Act, 1977, ch. 43, § 1(3). The defendant in Phekoo was charged with violating this section which provides:
If any person with intent to cause the residential occupier of any
premises(a) to give up the occupation of the premises or any part thereof;
or
(b) to refrain from exercising any right or pursuing any remedy
in respect of the premises or part thereof;
does acts calculated to interfere with the peace or comfort of the
residential occupier or members of his household, or persistently
withdraws or withholds services reasonably required for the occupation
of the premises as a residence, he shall be guilty of an offence.
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ment) Act of 1976.75 The second point was that any mistake,
whether reasonable or not, which was inconsistent with the existence of the necessary intention, must be an answer to the charge.
This, as Lord Hailsham said, was a requirement "of inexorable
6
logic," and inexorable logic must be of universal application.7
If a rule of law leads to only one logical conclusion, then either
that conclusion must be reached, or the rule of law must be modified. Otherwise, a judge directing a jury will be required to put
before them two incompatible alternatives and surely the law can
never admit that. There may, of course, be cases in which the
law does and should say that only a reasonable mistake will excuse.
Yet, in such cases the crime, by definition, is not one requiring
proof of intention; rather it is one which may be committed
negligently.
MORGAN AND DEFENSES

In Morgan," the defense was a simple denial of the prosecution's case. By charging rape, the prosecution alleged that the
defendant had intercourse with a woman who did not consent,
and that he knew that she did not consent or that he was reckless
as to whether she did not consent. The defendants denied the
knowledge or recklessness alleged.
There is another type of defense where the defendant admits
the allegations made by the prosecution but goes on to set up
further facts which, in law, excuse or justify his action. For example, a defendant charged with an assault causing bodily harm
may admit that he intentionally caused the bodily harm in question, but assert that he did so to repel an unlawful attack made
upon him by the alleged victim of the assault. In the language
of civil pleadings, he confesses and avoids. Suppose he believes
that he is the victim of an attack but his belief is mistaken. He
is not being attacked at all. His mistake is not about how much
force the law permits, which is a different question, but simply one
of fact. If he had reasonable grounds for that mistaken belief,
then it is clear that he has a good defense to the charge. Suppose,
however, that the belief, though honest, was unreasonable. Does
Morgan apply so as to provide a defense? There are dicta in that
case which suggest that it does not and, certainly, there is no logical
75. See J.C. SMITH & B.

HOGAN, supra note 21, at 400.
76. For Lord Hailsham's statement, see text accompanying note 48 supra.

77. For a discussion of Morgan, see text accompanying notes 43-52 supra.
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necessity for it to do so. 78 To require reasonable grounds for the
defendant's belief would not involve putting inconsistent propositions before a jury unless some broader requirement of mens rea
than an intention to use force has previously been accepted. Thus,
if it were to be held that the mens rea of assault is an intention to
use unlawful force (a not unreasonable proposition) the inconsistency would again arise.
In 1980, the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division
held in Albert v. Lavin 79 that they were bound by authority to
hold that an unreasonable belief in facts which would have justified force in self-defense was no defense. 80 The defendant, unreasonably, but perhaps honestly, refused to believe that the person
arresting him was a policeman and forcibly resisted arrest.8' The
case was decided on the assumption (subsequently held to be unfounded) 82 that the arrest would have been unlawful and the
defendant would have been entitled to resist, if the person making
the arrest had not been a policeman.8 3 The court distinguished 8
between a mistake as to the "definitional elements" of the offense
(as in Morgan), which need not be reasonable, and a mistake as to
the elements of a defense (such as self-defense) which must be reasonable.8 5 Thus, if a defendant were relying on the defense of
duress or compulsion, his belief that his own life was threatened
if he did not commit the crime could not found a defense if
the belief were unreasonable, however convinced the defendant
might in fact be as to the dangerousness of his circumstances. This
opinion has subsequently received support in dictum from the
Court of Appeal in Graham, 6 a case involving duress. In Albert,
the court recognised the anomalous nature of the distinction they
felt bound to apply. Mr. Justice Hodgson stated:

878.

78. See 1976 A.C. at 211-12.
79. 72 Crim. App. 178 (1980), afl'd on other grounds, [1981] 3 All E.R.
80. Id. at 183, 191.
81. Id. at 181-82.
82. Id. at 190-91.

83. Id. at 183.
84. Id. at 189-90.
85. Id. at 188.
86. 74 Crim. App. 235 (1981). The defendant in Graham, who helped his
homosexual lover kill the defendant's wife, claimed duress as a defense. In
refuting the defense, the court stated:
As a matter of public policy, it seems to us essential to limit the
defence of duress by means of an objective criterion formulated in
terms of reasonableness ....

The law requires a defendant to have
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And no matter how strange it may seem that a defendant
charged with assault can escape conviction if he shows
that he mistakenly but unreasonably thought his victim
was consenting but not if he was in the same state of
mind as to whether his victim had a right to detain him,
that in my judgment, is the law.8 7
Lord Justice Donaldson, agreeing, added: "However, an illfounded but completely honest and genuine belief removes all or
much of the culpability involved in the offence. It therefore
provides powerful mitigation and in an appropriate case would
justify a court granting an absolute discharge." Il
Of course it must be and is open to a legislature to provide
that belief can found a defense only if it is based on reasonable
grounds if it considers that policy so requires. In the absence
of any declared legislative policy, courts may also so hold. The
effect of so limiting such a defense would be, however, to convict
the defendant because of his negligence-failure to take sufficient
care to ascertain that facts existed which would justify his actions.
If the offense with which he is charged is not one which can be
committed negligently, such as assault, it is strange that the defendant should be liable when his only real fault is negligence.
The better view is that the subjective principle should apply to the
definitional elements of a defense just as it does to the definitional
elements of a crime.
THE REINTERPRETATION

OF RECKLESSNESS

The most severe blow to the subjectivist standpoint has come
from the reinterpretation of the concept of recklessness. Decisions in the Court of Appeal had settled, apparently firmly, that
the subjective standard was to be applied in the sense proposed
by the authors of the American Model Penal Code and the English Law Commission. This standard required proof of the conscious taking of an unjustifiable risk. 9 The House of Lords had
not pronounced on this matter until March 19, 1981, when their
the self-control reasonably to be expected of the ordinary citizen in
his situation.
Id. at 241.

87. 72 Crim. App. at 190.
88. Id. at 191.
89. For the relevant Court of Appeal opinions and Model Penal Code
provisions, see notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra.
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Lordships delivered judgment in two cases, Regina v. Caldwell, °
a case under the Criminal Damage Act of 1971,91 and Regina v.
Lawrence,92 a case of reckless driving.

Caldwell had been doing work for the proprietor of a residential hotel. One night, when very drunk, he took revenge on
the proprietor, against whom he had a grievance, by breaking a
window of the hotel and starting a fire in a ground floor room.
There were some ten guests staying in the hotel. Fortunately,
the fire was quickly discovered and put out before any serious
damage was done and no one was injured. 93 Caldwell was charged
in two counts.9 4 He pleaded guilty to the first count brought
under section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act; 95 he was charged
with causing damage to property belonging to another, intending
to damage such property or being reckless as to whether such
property would be damaged. To the second, more serious count,
Caldwell pleaded not guilty.96 This count was brought under
section 1(2) of the same Act 97 and charged him with causing damage to property belonging to another intending by the damage
to endanger the life of another or being reckless as to whether
the life of another would thereby be endangered. Caldwell
claimed that it never crossed his mind that there might be people
in the hotel whose lives might be endangered. He relied upon
90. 73 Crim. App. 13 (1981).
91. For the text of section 1(1) of this Act, see note I supra.
92. 73 Grim. App. 1 (1981). For criticism of the discussion in Caldwell
and Lawrence, see Griew, Recklessness Damage and Reckless Driving: Living
with Caldwell and Lawrence, 1981 GRIM. L. REV. 743; Leigh & Temkin, Notes
of Cases: Recklessness Revisited, 45 MODERN L. REV. 198 (1982); Smith, Commentary: R. v. Caldwell, 1981 GRIM. L. REV. 393; Smith, Commentary: R. v.
Lawrence, 1981 CRuI. L. REV. 410; Wells, Swatting the Subjectivist Bug, 1982;
GRIM. L. REV. 209; Williams, Recklessness Redefined, supra note 56, at 252.
93. 73 Grim. App. at 15.
94. Id. at 15-16.
95. For the text of section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act, see note I
supra.
96. 73 Grim. App. at 16.
97. Criminal Damage Act, 1971, ch. 48, § 1(2). This subsection provides:
A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property,
whether belonging to himself or another(a) intending to destroy or damage any property or being reckless
as to whether any property would be destroyed or damaged;
and
(b) intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life
of another or being reckless as to whether the life of another
would be thereby endangered;
shall be guilty of an offence.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss6/3

20

Smith: Subjective or Objective - Ups and Downs of the Test of Criminal L
1981-82]

1199

CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN ENGLAND

his self-induced drunkenness to support his otherwise implausible
story that he did not realize that there was a risk to life.98 The
argument in the lower courts revolved around the effect of drunkenness and the question which was certified for the decision of the
House was whether evidence of self-induced intoxication can be
relevant to the questions of whether the defendant intended to
endanger the life of another or whether he was reckless, whether
the life of another would be endangered.9 9 This, in effect, invited the House to decide whether section 1(2) of the Act created
an offense of "specific intent," in which case an intoxicated mistake might be a defense or an offense of "basic" or "general intent,"
in which case it could not. 0 0 The House, however, chose to decide the case on a different basis, which did not involve any special
rules relating to intoxication. They adopted a new and extended
definition of recklessness which enabled them to say that Caldwell
was reckless as to whether he was endangering life and was therefore guilty. Lord Diplock, with whom two Law Lords concurred,
stated that a person is reckless
[If] (1) he does an act which in fact creates an obvious
risk that property will be destroyed or damaged and (2)
when he does the act he either had not given any thought
to the possibility of there being any such risk or has
recognised that there was some risk involved and has
nonetheless gone on to do it.1° '
In the present case, the act done by Caldwell created an obvious risk that life would be endangered. Therefore, by admitting
that he never gave any thought to that possibility, he admitted
recklessness thus defined. In Lawrence, the House went on to
apply the same extended concept of recklessness to the offense
of reckless driving, 1 02 and it is clear that the House intended this
98. 73 Grim. App. at 16.

99. Id.
100. See J.C. SMITH & B.

HOcAN,

supra note 21, at 184-88.

101. 73 Grim. App. at 20.
102. 73 Grim. App. at 10-12, citing Regina v. Caldwell,
(1981). The action against Lawrence was brought under
Act, 1972, ch. 20, §§ 1, 2. These sections, as amended by
Act, 1977, § 50, provide:
1. Causing death by reckless or dangerous driving
(1) A person who causes the death of another person
motor vehicle on a road recklessly shall be guilty of an

73 Grim. App. 13
the Road Traffic
the Criminal Law

by driving a
offence.
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concept to be applicable to statutory offenses where the word
"reckless" is used, in the absence of an indication to the contrary.
The Caldwell definition of recklessness departs from those set
forth in the Model Penal Code and recommended by the Law
Commission in that under it a person may be convicted of recklessness although he is unaware of the existence of the risk, but
ought to have known of it. To this extent, it applies an objective
test in the sense in which I have defined the term. Section 8 of
the Criminal Justice Act of 1967 is by-passed because foresight is
not required by the substantive law. The decision does not, however, affect those cases which decided that the word "maliciously"
does require foresight of results. 0 3 Thus, we must apply a different and more lenient test in the surviving statutes which use
the word "maliciously," including the very important Offences
against the Person Act. Under Caldwell, Parliament is held to
have introduced a stricter test in the Criminal Damage Act and
other Acts which use the word "recklessly." This was not intended
by the Law Commission which framed the Criminal Damage
Act 104 and there are no grounds for supposing that it was intended
by Parliament. But it is now settled unless altered by legislation.
AN OBVIOUS RISK-OBVIOUS TO WHOM?

Caldwell stated that risk must be an "obvious" one.10 5 Yet
the question remains, obvious to whom? Is it sufficient that it
would have been obvious to a reasonable and prudent man who
gave thought to the matter? Or is it necessary that it would have
been obvious to the particular defendant had he directed his
mind to the question? The judgments in Caldwell and Lawrence
are unfortunately not clear on the matter. The House in Caldwell
suggests that we have to consider the particular defendant, whereas
in Lawrence, the House, while purporting to apply the same principles, was evidently looking to the reasonable man. The difference, in my opinion, is likely to be marginal. It would make
2. Reckless driving
A person who drives a motor vehicle on a road recklessly shall be
guilty of an offence.

Id.
103. For a discussion of the evolution of the word "maliciously" in cases
and offenses, see notes 31-38 and accompanying text supra.
104. For the Law Commission's intent, see note 38 and accompanying text

supra.
105. 73 Grim. App. at 20-21.
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a difference only in an exceptional case like that of Stephenson.'"8
The defendant in Stephenson was a tramp who sheltered in a
hollow in a haystack and, feeling cold, lit a fire in the hollow.
The haystack was destroyed by fire. l07 The evidence showed that
the tramp was suffering from schizophrenia and because of his
condition, he may not have been aware of the risk.10 8 The jury
which convicted him was instructed that "a man is reckless if he
carries out a deliberate act . . . closing his mind to the obvious
fact that there was some risk of danger" 109 and further, that one
reason a man might close his mind to the obvious fact might be
schizophrenia. They were not instructed that the schizophrenia
might have prevented the idea of danger entering the appellant's
head at all and, because of this omission, his conviction was
quashed. 110 Under the circumstances, a reasonable man could
hardly fail to be aware of the risk, whereas Stephenson, even if he
had thought about it, might have come to the conclusion that there
was no risk. Unless we are dealing with an abnormal person,
the answer to the questions of whether a reasonable and prudent
man would have been aware of the risk if he had stopped to
think and whether the defendant would have been aware of the
risk if he had stopped to think will be the same. The very fact
that we have to assume that the defendant had thought about the
matter removes any significant distinction between him and the
reasonable man. Where we all sometimes differ from the reasonable man is in failing to consider whether there is a risk. Such
failure may be attributed to a number of internal states, such as
fatigue, excitement, anger, anxiety, or absent-mindedness. The
hypothesis that the defendant has thought about it removes any
distinction, unless he is an abnormal person.
Why did the House of Lords in Caldwell take this step? In
the first place Lord Diplock thought that there was no difference
in culpability between the defendant in Caldwell and one who
was reckless in the previously accepted sense:
If it had crossed his mind that there was a risk that someone's property might be damaged but, because his mind
was affected by rage or excitement or confused by drink,
he did not appreciate the seriousness of the risk or
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

69
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Crim. App. 213 (1979).
at 215.
at 216.
at 214.
at 220.
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trusted that good luck would prevent its happening, this
state of mind would amount to malice in the restricted
meaning placed upon that term by the Court of Appeal;
whereas if, for any of these reasons, he did not even
trouble to give his mind to the question whether there
was any risk of damaging the property this state of mind
would not suffice to make him guilty of an offence under
the Malicious Damage Act 1861. Neither state of mind
seems to me less blameworthy than the other."Is it proper to equate the blameworthiness of a person who
fails to realize that there is a risk of some harmful consequence
with that of one who does realize that there is such a risk and
decides to take it? It is submitted that there is a real distinction
in degree of blameworthiness between the two cases.
Secondly, Lord Diplock thought that the distinction made by
the pre-Caldwell law (and the existing law in offenses which may
be committed maliciously) "would not be a practicable distinction
for use in a trial by jury." 112 Lord Diplock said:
The only person who knows what the accused's mental
processes were is the accused himself-and probably not
even he can recall them accurately when the rage or excitement under which he acted has passed, or he has
sobered up if he were under the influence of drink at the
113
relevant time.
If Lord Diplock thought that the new test enabled the court
to avoid making fine distinctions, he was, with respect, in error.
A person who does an act involving an obvious risk of harm may
have one of three states of mind: he may be aware of the risk;
he may believe that there is no risk; or he may not have considered
whether there is a risk. Before Caldwell, only the first state of
mind amounted to recklessness. The novel element in the decision is that the third state of mind also amounts to recklessness.
The second state still does not. The distinction between the
second and third states of mind may involve distinctions as fine
and subtle as any of which it is possible to conceive.
Since Caldwell, the Court of Appeal has applied the principle
of that case to rape because the statutory definition of rape also
111. 73 Crim. App. at 17-18.
112. Id. at 18.
113. Id.
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includes the word "reckless": the defendant is guilty if he is reckless whether the woman consented to sexual intercourse.11 4 Recently, in the case of Regina v. Pigg,n 5 the court said, in dicta,
that a man is guilty of rape where the woman was not in fact
consenting and there was an obvious risk that she might not be,
if the defendant never addressed his mind to the possibility that
she might not be consenting."" Of course, it remains the law that
if he actually believed (even unreasonably) that she was consenting
he is not guilty of rape. The distinction requires us to envisage
a man who both 1) does not consider the possibility that the
woman may not be consenting and 2) does not believe that she is
consenting. If the man does not consider the possibility that the
woman may not be consenting, does it not follow that he believed
she was consenting? If it does, the third state of mind does not
exist as a separate entity; yet the judge is bound to direct the
jury as if it did. Is not this a much more fine and impracticable
distinction than anything involved in the pre-Caldwell concept
of recklessness? The difficulty of looking into the defendant's
mind as Lord Diplock recognizes, is inherent in the whole concept
of mens rea: "[M]ens rea is, by definition, a state of mind of the
accused himself at the time he did the physical act that constitutes
the actus reus of the offence; it cannot be the mental state of
some non-existent, hypothetical person." 117
DoEs CALDWELL REQUIRE PROOF OF A STATE OF MIND?

While Lord Diplock seems to consider it axiomatic that mens
rea requires proof of the state of the defendant's mind, it is by no
means clear that this is the effect of Caldwell. Whether a risk is
"obvious" will almost invariably depend on the evidence as to the
external circumstances. This is so whether it must be obvious to
the defendant, or merely to the reasonable man. Once the obvious
risk is proved, it does not matter whether the defendant realized
there was a risk and decided to take it or never even considered
whether there was a risk. Either way he is guilty. He can escape
only if he considered the matter and decided that there was no
risk. It seems that the jury will not need to consider this third
possibility unless the defendant has introduced some evidence of it.
114. For the definition of rape in the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act
of 1976, see note 41 supra.
115. 74 Crim. App. 352 (1982).
116. Id. at 362.
117. 73 Crim. App. at 19.
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This appears most plainly in Lawrence, the reckless driving case,
where Lord Diplock stated that
[i]f satisfied that an obvious and serious risk was
created by the manner of the defendant's driving, the
jury are entitled to infer that he was in one or other of
the states of mind required to constitute the offence and
will probably do so; but regard' must be given to any
explanation he gives as to his state of mind which may displace the inference.11
The only explanation which could displace the inference
would seem to be that the defendant had considered whether there
was a risk and decided there was none. The passage suggests that
there is a burden on the defendant, not to prove this, but to introduce evidence of it. If that is right, and no such evidence is
introduced, then the defendant is liable on proof that the risk was
an obvious one-an objective question.
To support the subjectivist theory of criminal liability is not
to deny that there is a place for offenses where an objective test
is justified, as with offenses of negligence. For example, negligence
is the appropriate criterion of liability in many regulatory offenses,
the very purpose of which is to ensure a high standard of care in
the carrying on of certain activities like the sale of food and drugs,
where negligence can be extremely harmful to the public. It is
in the case of serious crime, where conviction involves a grave
stigma and liability to heavy punishment, that an objective standard is inappropriate. Murder, rape and theft are not offenses
for which mere negligence should justify conviction. A person
who deliberately chooses to bring about a particular harmful event,
or who chooses to take an unjustifiable risk of bringing about that
event, may properly be held responsible for the event when it
occurs. The person who is merely negligent does not choose to
bring it about or choose to take a risk of bringing it about. That
is a moral difference which justifies drawing the line at this point.
Negligence is, of course, by definition, a fault; but not every fault
should entail criminal liability. The process of the enforcement
of the criminal law is costly and produces much pain. We should
have no more criminal law than is absolutely necessary. The onus
of proof should be on the objectivist to show that we need criminal
liability for negligence.
118. 73 Crim. App. at 11.
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